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Abstract
We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal-agent problem with multiple
agents. When output distributions are uncertain, models of ambiguity aversion suggest that
tournaments may become more attractive than independent wage contracts, in contrast to
the case where output distributions are known. We do so by presenting agents with a choice
between tournaments and independent contracts, which are designed in a way that under
uncertainty about output distribution (that is, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents
should typically prefer tournaments, while ambiguity neutral agents prefer independent con-
tracts, independent of their degree of risk aversion. This is the case, because the tournament
removes all ambiguity about the equilibrium wages. We compare the share of participants
who choose the tournament under ambiguity with the share of participants choosing the
tournament in a control treatment, where output distributions are know. As the theory pre-
dicts, we nd indeed that under ambiguity the share of agents who choose the tournaments
is higher than in the case of known output distributions.
JEL classication: D01; D03; D81; M55
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; tournaments; Ellsberg urn; contract design
1 Introduction
We analyze experimentally the eect of subjective uncertainty about the outcome distributions
(ambiguity) on the evaluation of outcome-dependent payment schemes, as they arise for instance
in principal-agent problems. Particularly, we are interested to verify whether ambiguity aversion
has important consequences for the design of optimal contracts.
From a theoretical point of view, Kellner (2010) argues that in many situations ambiguity
aversion could make tournaments more attractive than other types of incentive contracts. This
is the case because, even if outcome distributions are uncertain, tournaments can be designed so
that they eliminate all payo-relevant ambiguity from a wage contract, but at the same time still
provide incentives to the agents to exert eort. Hence taking ambiguity aversion into account
could narrow the gap between the predictions of theoretical models and the type of incentive
contracts that are actually used in practice.
For instance, it is often claimed that rank-dependent wage regimes { like tournaments { play
an important role in the determination of wages in rms. Theoretical foundations for the use of
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seminar participants in Bonn and Jena for helpful discussions and comments. Furthermore the authors are
grateful to the support of the Deusche Forschungs Gemeinschaft under the grant RTG 1411
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the way incentives are provided to white-collar workers could be best understood as a tourna-
ment: In many rms wages vary little with performance, but wage increases typically go together
with promotions within the rm, which is often granted to the best of the current employees.
In this sense, a promotion awards a monetary prize to the agent with the highest performance,
as in a tournament. In the absence of ambiguity (or if agents are assumed ambiguity neutral)
there are few reasons why a principal would actually prefer tournaments.1 Thus, a principal who
seeks to design the optimal incentive contract might prefer tournaments in situations where the
(eort-dependent) output distributions are uncertain, while they would prefer an independent
contract if output distributions are purely risky.
To see whether this theoretical argument for the use of rank-dependent payment regimes
eectively bears empirical relevance and helps to answer the question of how to design incentive
contracts optimally under ambiguity, we investigate experimentally how decision-makers evalu-
ate two types of payment schemes under ambiguity. Each of two agents draw a ball, labelled
with a number, from an identical urn with unknown composition. The rst payment scheme
resembles a tournament: The participant whose ball is labelled with the higher number gets a
monetary prize, the other participant only a show-up fee. In the second type of payment scheme
the participant gets a monetary price if she draws a suciently high number, independently of
the draw for the other agent.
As the participants do not know the composition of the urn, they face uncertainty about the
probabilities of drawing a ball with a certain label. Hence, they are confronted with ambiguity.
We study whether such ambiguity aects the evaluation of the two types of payments schemes.
Here, uncertainty about probabilities is payo relevant only in case of the independent payment
scheme. For tournaments, the probability of drawing a higher number does not depend on the
distribution of balls in the urn. Hence, for ambiguity averse agents, tournaments could become
more attractive over independent payment schemes, and we want to test this hypothesis.
Numerous experiments based on the Ellsberg's well-known thought experiment have sug-
gested that many decision makers are ambiguity averse. However tournaments become more
attractive under ambiguity only if agents perceive a bet on drawing the higher of two balls from
an urn indeed as unambiguous, even if the composition of the underlying urn is uncertain. Many
models of ambiguity aversion who accommodate the typical Ellsberg choices would suggest this,
but experiments in the style of Ellsberg-paradox do not shed any light on this question.
More generally, to the best of our knowledge, no other experiment has studied the evaluation
of rank-dependent contracts like tournaments under ambiguity. A number of experiments tried
to rene our understanding of the behavior of agents under ambiguity, which provide important
insights for the design and the interpretation of our experiment. For instance, (Fox & Tversky
1995) show that the eect of ambiguity seems to be larger if agents are confronted with choices
where ambiguity matters only for some payment options , while it becomes less relevant if agents
only have ambiguous choices available. Halevy (2007) suggests that agents who dislike bets on
the composition of an ambiguous urn also dislike bets from an urn of which the distribution was
determined at random. Hence, failure to reduce compound lotteries could be the underlying
factor behind the Ellsberg paradox. Therefore, one possible reason why even ambiguity averse
agents might not prefer tournaments is that agents might nd the exact implications of the
payment schemes hard to understand. Hence, if mathematical diculties are the main reasons
why agents fail to reduce compound lotteries, they may fail to understand the fact that certain
1In general, other types of incentive contracts lead to higher payos for the principal. See Kellner (2010) for
a more detailed discussion of the theoretical literature on tournaments as incentive contracts.
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compound lotteries could make such agents appear less ambiguity averse (in contrast to Halevy
(2007)). To address the importance of this issue, we oer mathematical help to some of the
participants in our experiment.
Additionally, it might also be true that not ambiguity aversion, but other concerns motivate
agents to prefer tournaments. It has been suggested that some agents might prefer situations
in which they compete against others (as they do in tournaments), for instance as they nd
such situations more exciting. Other agents might instead be \competition averse", that is
they seek to avoid competition. Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) argue for instance that women
tend to belong more often to the second group than men. To see to which extent the agents'
preference for tournaments can actually be attributed to ambiguity aversion (in comparison to
other motives like \competition aversion", we expose some of the agents instead to a similar
environment without ambiguity, where both ambiguity averse agents as well as ambiguity neutral
agents should never nd it optimal to choose a tournament. In addition we conducted (in an
unannounced bonus round after the actual experiment) a classical Ellsberg type experiment to
control for ambiguity averion.
We have ruled out some issues that are present in the evaluation of payments schemes like
tournaments in reality. Our approach abstracts from strategic ambiguity or ambiguity about
skills. We do this in order to be able to focus on the role of the ambiguity of the outcome
process.
We nd that ambiguity in fact increases the share of subjects choosing tournaments signif-
icantly { in particular among ambiguity averse agents. However, this eect does not appear
equally strong for all agents, and it seems that an intrinsic aversion against competitive sit-
uations could explain why even some ambiguity averse agents do not nd tournaments more
attractive under ambiguity.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we will give an outline of the underlying
theoretical predictions. Section 3 focuses on the implementation of the experiment. Section 4
describes and discusses the experimental results. First, we focus on the share of people choosing
the tournament and how it varies between treatments in the experiment and characteristics
of the participants. Second, we use OLS and Logit regressions to illustrate how ambiguity,
ambiguity aversion and other factors inuence the choices of the agents. We will discuss to
which extent our results might be specic to the context of our experiment, and how we could
clarify this and other issues using further experiments in Section 5.
2 Theory
We present the agents with the choice of dierent kinds of payment schemes in a particularly
simple setting: The output of the agents is just a random draw from an urn with balls labeled 1 to
10. Half of the agents are presented with an ambiguous environment, in which the composition of
the balls in the urn is unknown, the other half are presented with an unambiguous environment,
in which the distribution over balls is known to be uniform. Agents are given a choice between
independent schemes, in which the payo of the agents depends only on the ball they draw
themselves, or payment schemes where an agent's payment depends only on whether she draws
a ball higher or lower than the ball of the other agent.
Despite the absence of eort, this setting can help us to understand the importance of ambi-
guity and ambiguity aversion also in the case of incentive contracts (with multiple agents) where
such payment schemes are most commonly used. From a principal's point of view, without eort
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we are mainly interested to see how the agent's preference between dierent types of contracts
changes with ambiguity, and hence it should not be a very relevant whether in fact these con-
tracts were oered out of a principal's need to prevent the agents from deviating to another
action, or presented to the agents by the experimenter, without including the principal's role in
the experiment at all.
Now we describe the environment that the agents are facing, and the payment schemes
oered to them in more detail. Then we derive theoretical predictions of the agents' behavior.
Ambiguous environment
In the ambiguous environment, agents are rst presented with the following information about
an urn, from which their \output" is drawn: They are told the total number of balls (100), the
fact that the balls are labeled with numbers (1 to 10), but not how they are distributed within
the urn.
Purely risky environment
In the purely risky environment, agents are also presented with an urn containing 100 balls,
but they have additional information about the urn: They know that the labels are uniformly
distributed (10 balls of each label).
Schemes oered to the agents
Participants are divided into pairs, and they are presented with the following four payment
schemes to choose from. Each of these schemes species the way how the agent's payout depends
on the outcomes of a stochastic process. We denote by xT (xI) the base payment for the
tournament or the independent scheme, respectively, while pI (pT) is the bonus payment for
reaching a target in the independent scheme or winning the tournament.
I1 =
(










xT + pT if own ball higher than ball of other participant
xT if own ball lower than ball of other participant





xT + pT if own ball higher than ball of other participant
xT if own ball lower than ball of other participant
coin ip between the above if both balls equal
The rst two schemes (I1 and I2) are individual schemes where wages depend only on each
participant's own draw, while the latter (T1 and T2) introduce an elementary form of competition:
Wages depend on a comparison with the other agent, in which only the rank of the agent matters,
not the dierence in the number drawn by the agents. Hence, we refer to these schemes as
tournaments.
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In determining the payment options, we chose payments such that the following two properties
are satised. On the one hand, we wanted to make sure that no ambiguity neutral agent (who
maximizes her expected utility) prefers the tournament, while ambiguity averse agents would
typically do so. On the other hand, the extent to which agents prefer the tournament should
depend as little as possible on the agent's risk attitude. Hence, we chose the \prize" that each
scheme pays in case of a favorable draw to be equal for all types of payment schemes (i.e.
pI = pT = p), while the guaranteed payment, which the agent gets independent of her draw, to
be slightly higher for the independent scheme (i.e. xI   xT > 0, but small). In this case, based
on the model by (Kellner 2010), we would expect the agents to behave in the following way,
depending on the environment:
Ambiguous environment
Participants who maximize their expected utility cannot prefer the tournament: Suppose they
consider the probability that the ball drawn at random has a label of 6 or above to equal a
(presumably because they think the number of balls with a label of 6 or above is 100a, at least
in an average sense). In this case, one of the two individual schemes promises an incremental
prize of p with a probability of at least 50% (precisely, either a or 1   a), while the schemes T1
and T2 promise the same prize with a probability of 50% irrespective of the distribution of balls.
Ambiguity averse agents however can strictly prefer the tournament. The independent scheme
yields a price with an unknown probability, but the tournament does not. Hence, ambiguity
aversion makes only the independent schemes less attractive. In particular, if agents perceive
ambiguity to be symmetric (at least in some average sense, they think that the number of balls
above 5 equals the number of balls 5 or below), they will prefer the tournament over any of the
two independent schemes, provided the dierence in expected payos (corresponding to xI  xT)
is small enough. Appendix A discusses the evaluation of the two types of payment schemes in
greater detail.
We oered agents to choose between two kinds of independent schemes because otherwise
agents might choose the tournament if they expect that those balls which lead to high payos
in the independent scheme are underrepresented in the urn. We included a second kind of
tournaments for reasons of symmetry, but both ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral agents
should always be indierent between the two types of tournaments.
Purely risky environment
In the purely risky environment a is known to be 0.5 and hence U(I1) = U(I2) > U(Ti), whether
or not agents are ambiguity averse (as ambiguity is absent).
We summarize by postulating the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1 describes how the
behavior of ambiguity averse agents is expected to dier from the behavior of ambiguity neutral
agents.
Hypothesis 1. (a) In the ambiguous environment, a larger share of participants will choose the
tournament. (b) In particular, participants who are ambiguity averse will choose the tournament,
as only for these agents ambiguity matters. Ambiguity neutral agents should not choose the
tournament.
Hypothesis 2 postulates that, in the absence of ambiguity, agents behave like Expected utility
maximizers.
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nament is close to zero, as the tournament results in a distribution of wages dominated by the
independent schemes.
Potential confounds
We expected that the following confounds could either prevent participants to choose as hypoth-
esized or suggest alternative explanations for our ndings. First, people might nd some kinds
of payment schemes harder to understand than others (even if it is not entirely evident which
kind of scheme should be easier to understand).2 Second, people might prefer the tournament
if they consider it more exciting to compete against another participant. Alternatively, they
might avoid the tournament if they feel uncomfortable with the fact that they are compared
with someone else (even if they have no real way to inuence their own outcome). Hence in
designing the experiment we tried to either rule out these possible confounding eects or to elicit
in which way they aect our results, as we will now describe in greater detail.
Furthermore, in order to control whether the eects we nd can be attributed to ambiguity
aversion as understood by Ellsberg, we added a standard two-color Ellsberg urn at the end of
the experiment. Subjects were presented with two urns. Urn A contained 10 ball labelled 1 and
10 balls labelled 2, whhile urn B contained an unknown, but xed distribution of those balls.
Subjects then had to chose an urn and a number, and if the number was drawn from the chosen
urn, subjects received ECU 6.90. The results of this experiment we used then in the regression
analyis.
3 Design
To test our main hypothesis (1a) we present half of the participants with the ambiguous environ-
ment, where subjects were not informed about the process that distributes the ball in the urn,3
while half are presented with an \unambiguous" urn resulting in a purely risky environment.4
We also informed them that the process of drawing balls from the urn will be simulated by the
computer. Prizes were chosen to equal the following amounts (in ECU, the exchange rate to
Euro was 1ECU=0.4 e).
Schemes oered to the agents
Participants are divided into pairs, and they are all presented with a choice between the four
schemes introduced in the theoretical discussion above. The schemes were described using the
following terminology:
2For the independent schemes it is quite clear that the probability of winning the higher price depends only on
the (expected) number of balls above 5 in the urn in relation to the number of balls 5 or below. If those numbers
are expected to be identical, it appears rather easy to understand that the chance of winning p is 0.5. For the
tournament it appears very hard to compute the chances of winning if one tries to compute the winning chances
by aggregating the likelihood of observing every outcome combination for any hypothesized winning probability.
However, if a participant understands that a tournament would give a prize to exactly one of two agents treating
them identically (even if the other agent has the option to be rewarded in another way), it might be at least
equally easy to see that the winning probability is always 0.5.
3The actual distribution was known to the experimenters. For subjects with even subject number, only balls
from the range 4-10 were contained in the urn (and each of those labels on average equally often), while for
subjects with odd subject numbers, the urn consisted only of balls labeled 1-7.
4These subjects were informed that 100 balls labeled 1-10 were in that urn and they were uniformly distributed.
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 You receive ECU 24.40 if your ball shows 6 or a higher number. You receive ECU 5.40 if
your ball shows 5 or a smaller number. The number on the ball of your partner does not
play a role.
 You receive ECU 24.40 if your ball shows 5 or a lower number. You receive ECU 5.40 if
your ball shows 6 or a higher number. The number on the ball of your partner does not
play a role.
Tournament schemes
 You receive ECU 23.60 if your ball shows a higher number than the ball of your competitor.
You receive ECU 4.60 if the number is smaller. If both balls show the same number, a fair
coin decides whether you get the higher or the lower amount.
 You receive ECU 23.60 if your ball shows a lower number than the ball of your competitor.
You receive ECU 4.60 if the number is higher. If both balls show the same number, a fair
coin decides whether you get the higher or the lower amount.
When presenting these schemes to the agents, we use the neutral term \payment option"
and we also do not use any words or abbreviations suggesting an interpretation as tournament
or independent scheme. Note that we did not require both agents to be rewarded according to
the same type of scheme. (Alternatively we could have allowed only one of the two agents to
choose the type of scheme that applies to both.) We did so to isolate the nature of a potential
intrinsic preference for competitive situations. Here, all that could matter is whether the agent
herself prefers competitive situations, but not how she feels about forcing others to compete.
We decided to let agents choose between a few specic schemes instead of using a mechanism
that elicits their willingness to pay, as we felt that agents might nd it easier to understand
direct choices in comparison to an abstract mechanism. This might be an important concern
particularly under ambiguity aversion, as incentive compatible mechanisms like BDM (Becker,
DeGroot & Marschak 1964) add a further level of uncertainty to the experiment. Additionally,
Trautmann, Vieider & Wakker (forthcoming) suggest that when relying on the agents' WTP
they appear to be more ambiguity averse in comparison to situations where their direct choices
are used to elicit their ambiguity attitude.
4 Results
Figure 1 summarizes the shares of participants who chose the tournament in each of the four
treatments in the experiment, as well as the pooled results over the ambiguous and the risky urn.
As our theory predicts, the tournament is chosen more often under ambiguity. Among those
participants who do not face ambiguity about the output distribution, only 13% choose the tour-
nament. Under ambiguity, the share of tournaments increases to 31%. A mean comparison test
conrms that the dierence between the ambiguous and the unambiguous environment is signi-
cant below the 1 percent level according to a 2-Test (and according to Fisher's distribution-free
test).
Whether or not the agents are provided with mathematical help matters little. It has almost
no eect in the presence of ambiguity (with mathematical help, the share of tournaments drops
slightly from 33% to 31%). When agents know the output distribution, mathematical help
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Figure 1: Tournament share over treatments
decreases the share of participants choosing tournaments (from 14% to 10%). The eect of
ambiguity remains signicant in both cases.5 Hence, our experiment strongly conrms part
a) of Hypothesis 1: Under ambiguity, tournaments become more attractive in comparison to
independent schemes.
The regressions in Table 1 will further explain the choices of the participants. In particularly,
we will also discuss to which extent the data support part b) of Hypothesis 1, which links
the behavior of the agents in the two rounds of the experiment. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable indicating payment scheme choice (1 if an agent chose a tournament, 0 for an
independent scheme).
The rst regression includes only the eect of the key treatment variables on the share of
tournaments being the chosen scheme. The eect of ambiguity is positive (0.19) and signicant.6
The second regression includes the behavior of the participants in the second stage. It allows
the intercept and the eect of ambiguity to dier between participants who reveal ambiguity
aversion in their Ellsberg choices and those who do not (NotEllsberg). For the rst group, the
eect of ambiguity increases somewhat to 0.25 and remains signicant. For people who do not
reveal (enough) ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg experiment, the eect of ambiguity is lower
by a notable amount of 0.10 (but this decrease is not signicant). The resulting net eect of
ambiguity (0.15) becomes insignicant for this group.
The eect of oering mathematical help (calc) is small and insignicant: With help, subjects
go slightly less often into tournaments in the risky environment (so the number of people who
behave consistent with expected-utility maximization increases) while the eect of the ambiguous
urn treatment increases slightly (so more people make a choice consistent which ambiguity
aversion).
In line with the statistical analysis presented above, these regressions support part a) of
5 If mathematical help is not available, the eect of ambiguity is signicant at the 5% level according to a 
2
mean comparison test, and at the 3% level according to Fisher's (one-sided) test. When help is available, the
eect is signicant according to both test at the 1% level.
6For the linear probability model we use robust standard errors, as the dependent variable is binary. Robustness
checks, using a logit specication can be found in the appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambiguous 0.193 0.252 0.198 0.283 0.283
(0.083) (0.109) (0.080) (0.105) (0.095)
Calc -0.038 -0.036 -0.030 -0.026 0.009
(0.068) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.059)
Ambiguous  calc 0.022 0.015 0.013 0.003 -0.034
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.108)
Not ambiguity averse 0.030 0.050 0.070
(0.072) (0.067) (0.067)
Ambiguous  not amb.av. -0.097 -0.138 -0.168
(0.120) (0.117) (0.111)
Female 0.080 0.093 0.047
(0.088) (0.089) (0.087)
East -0.009 -0.003 -0.046
(0.085) (0.087) (0.086)






Constant 0.167 0.142 0.143 0.106 0.322
(0.130) (0.145) (0.071) (0.081) (0.128)
*.session no Yes Yes No No No
Observations 206 206 206 206 206
R2 0.122 0.126 0.093 0.100 0.174
Standard errors in parentheses
Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Choice of tournament.
Controlled for session eects and age in columns 1 and 2 only, as sessions were either all male or all female.
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
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part b) of Hypothesis 1 is less strong. While it is true that for agents who do not appear to be
ambiguity averse, ambiguity does not lead to a signicant increase, the dierence in the eect
of ambiguity between the ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral agents is also not statistically
signicant. Hence, our experiment does not conclusively answer this question.
The following factors could help to understand this nding. First, note that in the second
part of our experiment, the choices of the agents had less strong nancial consequences for
them. Hence, the second part of our experiment might miss a sharp separation of ambiguity
averse and not ambiguity averse subjects. Perhaps more importantly, participants could take
other considerations into account that we do not account for in our theoretical discussion. One
possible reason is, that some of the subjects are competition loving. We see that the constant
in the rst regression { so the share of subjects who chose competition in the risky urn without
mathematical help { is quite large, although not statistically signicant. This indicates that
some subject are competition loving, shedding some light on hypothesis 2, claiming that no
subject will chose the tournament in the risky environment. This hypothesis can not be fully
supported. Our discussion of the eect of oering mathematical help seems to suggest that
mathematical confusion might be an issue to a (perhaps small) extent.
In the nal three regressions we explore the possibility that decision makers have an intrinsic
attitude towards competition, which is not accounted for by the expected utility framework
nor models of ambiguity aversion, but which do aect their choices between dierent payment
options.
The third and forth regression includes additional demographic information about the par-
ticipants (regression four allows the eect of ambiguity to dier according to the behavior in the
second part, regression three does not). The inclusion of these factors emphasizes the importance
of ambiguity for payment scheme choices: comparing regression 4 to regression 2, the coecient
for the ambiguous treatments increases to 0.28. Additionally, the eect of ambiguity decreases
slightly to 0.14 for agents which are not ambiguity averse, since according to regression 4 the
eect of the ambiguous treatment is now lower by 0.14 for those agents who are not ambiguity
averse.
Hence, accounting for demographic information (potentially acting as a proxy for an intrin-
sic attitude over the types of payment schemes), participants behave somewhat more closely
as both parts of our main Hypothesis would suggest. The eect that these demographics have
on the participant's propensity to choose tournaments are as follows. Females per se choose
tournaments slightly more often than males (by 0.08), participants from former East-Germany
virtually as frequently as others. However, females from the East choose tournaments signi-
cantly less than males from the west (-0.11, the net eect of being a women and coming from
East Germany).
We also explored whether the eects of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion are similar between
the subgroups. Allowing the eect of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to dier according to
certain subgroups (like gender, calc, Ellsberg-behavior and of East German origin), changes
the size of the eects, but the directions of the eects do not change for any subgroup in all
reasonable specications. Results are available upon request.
To examine more closely hypothesis 2, we include additionally statements that the partici-
pants made in the questionnaire about their real world behavior and their views on competition
in the fth regression. We included the dummy \Competition averse", which is assigned to
those participants who stated in the questionnaire that the fact that their draw was compared
to the draw of another agent was a disadvantage for the tournament-like schemes. The constant
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in this regression the eect of ambiguity diers even more strongly with the agents choices in
the Ellsberg-stage: Now, the eect of being in the ambiguous treatment is 0.27 if ambiguity
aversion is revealed in the rst stage, but it is just 0.11 otherwise. In regression 5, also the eect
of being a women from the East is much lower. This mainly reduces the eects of female East
Germans who often appear to be competition averse in this regression. The extent to which
participants consider themselves willing to take risks (Risk loving) has almost no eect, which
is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Hence, it seems that an intrinsic attitude towards
competition in fact aects the behavior of the participants.
In general, these regressions lead to similar conclusions as our previous comparison of the
share of tournaments between dierent treatments and subgroups. Most notably, facing an
ambiguous environment makes a signicant dierence for ambiguity averse individuals (while
this eect is insignicant for agents who do not reveal ambiguity aversion through their Ellsberg-
choices).
5 Discussion
In our experiment we have focused so far on the eects of ambiguity on the agents' preferences
between tournaments and independent schemes. We found that in principle, ambiguity does
eect the evaluation of such payment schemes, making tournaments more favorable. Moreover,
we nd evidence that this is to some extent due to ambiguity aversion, but the link between
ambiguity aversion and a preference for tournaments is somewhat weaker than one could expect.
This might be to some extent explained by an intrinsic attitude towards competition, which could
interfere with the eect of ambiguity aversion.
While the experiment above addresses the fundamental source of the eect of ambiguity
in agency schemes, the problem that a principal faces when designing the optimal incentive
contract is somewhat more complex. Essentially, there are two issues which we have eliminated
in our experimental design. First, in the absence of eort, deciding which contract to accept
becomes an individual decision problem. If both agents can choose between dierent eort
levels, however, the choice of one agent inuences the payo of another agent. Hence, what
they think about the strategy of the other player might be important. Moreover, the strategy of
the other player could be viewed as an alternative source of ambiguity in our model. Hence, a
variation of this experiment could test whether uncertainty about the output distributions has
any additional implications for ambiguity averse agents, if the agents can improve productivity
by exerting eort.
Second, when a principal designs a contract to maximize her prot, the best independent
contract that the principal could design might be, in a sense, less risky than the best tournament
(while it would still be more ambiguous than the optimal tournament). Hence, if the agent's risk
aversion would be large in comparison to their ambiguity aversion, tournaments might not be
advantageous for some ambiguity averse agents. Further experiments could test to what extent
dierences in the agents' ambiguity aversion inuence the design of incentive contracts more
than dierences in risk aversion.
A Ranking of contracts
For any C 2 fT1;T2;I1;I2g, denote the utility that the agents uses to decide between dierent
contracts by U(C).
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For an expected utility maximizer, if a denotes the (expected) share of balls in the urn that have
a label of 6 or above, for the independent contracts
U(I1) = au(xI + p) + (1   a)u(xI);









Note that the inequality becomes an equality in the (natural) case where a = 1
2. However, since
the probability of winning the incremental prize p in a tournament is always 1
2, irrespective of
a, for the tournament contracts,
U(T1) = U(T2) =
1
2




Since xT < xI, for every expected utility maximizer maxfU(I1);U(I2)g > U(T1) = U(T2).
A.2 Ambiguity Aversion
To illustrate preferences under ambiguity we focus on two representative ambiguity models, the
smooth ambiguity model (Klibano, Marinacci & Mukerji 2005) and the max-min-Expected-
Utility model (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989).
The smooth model would suggest that an agent considers a set of priors, , to represent the
possible probability distributions for draws from the urn, and that a (second order) distribution 
indicates the likelihood that the agent attributes to each of these probability distributions. When
evaluating her choices, the agents computes rst the expected utility in the usual way. Hence,
when looking at the independent contracts, we can replace the set of probability distributions
 with a set of probabilities A. Any member of A just describes the probability that the drawn
ball is labelled 6 or above. Then the agent aggregates these expected utilities attributed to every









(au(xI) + (1   a)u(xI + p))d(a)









and the same is true for U(I2). In the natural case where
R
A ad = 1











But the evaluation of the tournament still does not vary with the elements of  (and hence
A) so that
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i 2 f1;2g it holds that U(Ii) < U(T1) = U(T2); so that tournaments are preferred by the agent.
Similarly, the max-min Expected utility model suggests that the agent evaluates the inde-
pendent contracts using a set of probability distributions A, where a 2 A species a possible
probability for drawn ball to be labelled 6 or above. Ambiguity aversion is modelled by assuming
that the agents evaluates every contract using the worst possible element of a, so that
U(I1) = min
a2A




[au(xI) + (1   a)u(xI + p)]
but
U(T1) = U(T2) =
1
2




Hence, if A contains elements both above and below 1
2; then for both i 2 f1;2g, U(Ii) <
1
2u(xI + p) + 1
2u(xI) and hence U(Ii) < U(T1) = U(T2) whenever xI   xT is suciently small.
In either case, tournaments can be preferred only under ambiguity aversion.
B Screenshots of the Experiment
Complete instructions (in German and English translations) as well as screen-shots of the ex-
perimental stages can be obtained from the authors upon request.
B.1 The What-if-calculator
The wording of the caluclation help in the ambiguous environment:
You can now calculate, how probable the dierent payments are under the four
options presented, if you knew how often each number of balls was present in the
urn. Please enter for every number that could be on a ball a value of 0-100. Then
press \Calculate". You can repeat this as often as you wish, your payment will not
be inuenced by how often you use this or which values you enter. Please note that
the entered values have to add up to 100.
C Robustness checks
Logit regressions (similar to table 1).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambiguous 1.217 1.646 1.207 1.758 1.964
(0.522) (0.769) (0.514) (0.752) (0.712)
Calc -0.403 -0.360 -0.345 -0.284 0.057
(0.635) (0.642) (0.630) (0.639) (0.616)
Ambiguous  calc 0.316 0.247 0.257 0.169 -0.192
(0.774) (0.781) (0.765) (0.774) (0.784)
Not ambiguity averse 0.323 0.395 0.588
(0.685) (0.665) (0.681)
Ambiguous  not amb.av. -0.667 -0.859 -1.162
(0.830) (0.803) (0.845)
Female 0.448 0.542 0.275
(0.470) (0.481) (0.534)
East -0.051 -0.023 -0.337
(0.504) (0.508) (0.583)






Constant -1.709 -1.981 -1.829 -2.145 -1.157
(0.710) (0.873) (0.508) (0.704) (0.956)
*.session no Yes Yes No No No
Observations 206 206 206 206 206
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.129 0.095 0.102 0.167
Standard errors in parentheses
Logistic model. Dependent variable: Choice of tournament.
Controlled for session eects and age in columns 1 and 2 only, as sessions were either all male or all female.
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
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